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Introduction: This study deals with consensus by poor persons in the informal sector in rural 
India on the benefit-package of their community-based health insurance (CBHI). In this article 
we describe the process of involving rural poor in benefit-package design and assess the underly-
ing reasons for choices they made and their ability to reach group consensus.
Methods: The benefit-package selection process entailed four steps: narrowing down the options 
by community representatives, plus three Choosing Healthplans All Together (CHAT) rounds 
conducted among female members of self-help groups. We use mixed-methods and four sources 
of data: baseline study, CHAT exercises, in-depth interviews, and evaluation questionnaires. We 
define consensus as a community resolution reached by discussion, considering all opinions, 
and to which everyone agrees. We use the coefficient of unalikeability to express consensus 
quantitatively (as variability of categorical variables) rather than just categorically (as a bino-
mial Yes/No).
Findings: The coefficient of unalikeability decreased consistently over consecutive CHAT 
rounds, reaching zero (ie, 100% consensus) in two locations, and confirmed gradual adop-
tion of consensus. Evaluation interviews revealed that the wish to be part of a consensus 
was dominant in all locations. The in-depth interviews indicated that people enjoyed the 
participatory deliberations, were satisfied with the selection, and that group decisions 
reflected a consensus rather than majority. Moreover, evidence suggests that pre-selectors 
and communities aimed to enhance the likelihood that many households would benefit 
from CBHI.
Conclusion: The voluntary and contributory CBHI relies on an engaging experience with oth-
ers to validate perceived priorities of the target group. The strongest motive for choice was the 
wish to join a consensus (more than price or package-composition) and the intention that many 
members should benefit. The degree of consensus improved with iterative CHAT rounds. Har-
nessing group consensus requires catalytic intervention, as the process is not spontaneous.
Keywords: benefit-package design, micro health insurance, community-based health 
insurance, CBHI
Introduction
In India, as in other low- and middle-income countries, most of the rural popula-
tion lives and works in the informal sector.1,2 The implied consequence of being 
“informal” is that people are often engaged in small-scale, self-employed activities 
(with or without hired workers), typically unrecorded, unregistered and conducted 
without proper integration with the administrative machinery responsible for enforc-
ing laws and regulations, usually escaping both the attention of and recognition from 
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the authorities.3 Thus, they are excluded from market or 
social arrangements through which they might benefit from 
health insurance.4 Under these conditions, several develop-
ment projects have been launched aimed at implementing 
health microinsurance at village or local level.5–11 Health 
microinsurance has originally been defined as a voluntary, 
contributory, community-based health insurance (CBHI) 
scheme for which the group designs the benefits, premiums, 
and/or governance structure, to be relevant and affordable to 
the local population.12,13 Different authors have used other 
names for the generic “microinsurance”, eg, Micro Health 
Insurance (MHI), Mutual Health Organizations (MHO) 
(in French Mutuelles de santé), CBHI, Community-based 
Health Funds (CBHF), Community Owned and Operated 
Plans (COOP) etc. The difference between these names is 
not discussed in detail in this paper, and we use the generic 
“microinsurance” for all kinds of systems versus CBHI to 
refer to a people-centered mutual aid scheme. This defini-
tion departs from classical demand theory, which views the 
individual as formulating demand; here, the group defines the 
demand and ideally pools both risks and resources to provide 
protection to all members.14 This formulation of demand 
relies on mobilization of collective action.
The questions that beg empirical evidence are whether 
and how rural poor without prior experience with health 
insurance can be engaged in a complex process of selecting 
a coherent benefit-package that will reflect their communal 
needs and priorities, rather than simply being told to buy 
cheap insurance. Involving the rural community means 
empowering them to define the benefit types that would be 
payable to insured persons, as well as all the rules on deduct-
ibles, co-payments, cost-sharing amounts (thresholds), or 
maxima (caps), and other conditions and limitations which 
may determine the share of health-care cost that will be borne 
by the insurance (and in our context, by the microinsurance 
or CBHI scheme). The working assumption underlying this 
research question is that when rural groups are involved, 
they can reach consensus on the composition and price of 
the benefit-package that reflects local notions of value-for-
money, leading to stronger motivation to enroll.
Literature on consumers’ preferences for health insurance 
plans has so far concentrated on rich countries.15–21 Only few 
publications deal with the health insurance benefit choices 
of low-income persons in low-income countries.22–24 Dror 
et al25 and Danis et al26 described simulation exercises (called 
“CHAT” – Choosing Healthplans All Together) in which rural 
poor in India were asked to compose health insurance pack-
ages by selecting benefit types that should be included within 
a severe budgetary limitation. The main lessons from those 
experiments were that rural poor were interested in broad 
coverage rather than coverage of only rare events.
Following on from those experiments, a 5-year EC-FP7 
project (2009–2014) on implementation of CBHI was launched 
by the Micro Insurance Academy (MIA), New Delhi27 
(http://www.microinsuranceacademy.org) in three locations 
in rural India (Pratapgarh and Kanpur-Dehat districts, Uttar 
Pradesh, and Vaishali district, Bihar).28 The MIA implemen-
tation model enables prospective members to be involved in 
decisions on the benefit-package that the CBHI schemes offer.29 
The prospective members selected pre-composed packages 
(rather than composing packages from a selection of benefit 
types, as was done under the earlier CHAT exercises) as well 
as premium levels that such packages commanded. The project 
unfolded in cooperation with field-partner non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs): BAIF (Bharatiya Agro Industries Foun-
dation) in Pratapgarh; Shramik Bharti in Kanpur-Dehat; and 
Nidan in Vaishali, and the implementation aimed at enrolling 
rural women that participate in self-help groups (groups of 
10–15 women saving together and giving each other loans 
from their common fund) (SHGs) facilitated by these field 
partners. These SHGs aim at economic and social empower-
ment and capacity building for women through micro-credit 
and other activities, with the intention to ultimately benefit the 
whole community.30 Both CHAT and the CBHI schemes also 
possess empowering features, as they allow local communities 
to exercise more control over decisions relating to health insur-
ance.31 Additionally, by targeting women in CHAT activities, 
the implementing partners aim at enhanced participation of 
women in economic and social spheres. In this context, MIA 
understands its role as both a catalytic actor and facilitator 
of the process through which the CBHI is introduced to the 
communities with the help of field partners, and aiding the 
establishment of the local schemes.32
The setting of the present study was the implementa-
tion of these three CBHI schemes. The purpose of this 
article is to describe the process of involving rural poor 
in benefit-package design, explaining the underlying 
reasons for choices they made, and assessing their ability 
to reach group consensus regarding package composition, 
against the background of the research question formulated 
earlier.
The article includes a section describing the data and 
methods, followed by a section presenting the results from 
three choice exercises. We then discuss the ramifications of 
those insurance choices. Finally, we formulate conclusions 
and policy recommendations.
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Table 1 Treatment and control households by location (2011)
Location Treatment Control Total 
households
Pratapgarh (Uttar Pradesh) 433 850 1,283
Kanpur-Dehat (Uttar Pradesh) 378 661 1,039
Vaishali (Bihar) 524 839 1,363
Total households 1,335 2,350 3,685
Notes: Treatment households are the sHg households that were offered the 
option to join the cBHi in 2011, and control households are the remaining sHg 
households who were not offered the option to join at that point in time.
Abbreviations: cBHi, community-based health insurance; sHg, self-help group.
Data and methods
Data
The study is based on four sources of data: a dataset obtained 
through a baseline study, CHAT exercises, in-depth inter-
views, and evaluation interviews. In accordance with the 
guidelines issued by the Indian Council of Medical Research, 
the overall study as well as the specific data collection tools 
used were checked and approved by the ethics committee of 
the University of Cologne, Germany.33
Baseline study
The source data for actuarial calculations of premiums of 
different benefits originates from a baseline survey of the 
5-year project, conducted March–May 2010 in three loca-
tions in rural India. The selection criterion of households for 
inclusion in the sample was that at least one female member 
was enrolled in an SHG, affiliated with the field partner NGO 
in March 2010. The calculation of incidence of illness and 
premiums for each location was based on the entire sample 
at that site. Table 1 contains the detailed information on the 
sample, by location. More information on the context of 
the study is provided in Table S1.
cHaT exercises data
Group choice exercises were conducted in which female 
SHG groups were invited to “play CHAT” with the help 
of pictorial boards showing different benefit-packages 
and the related premium (a picture of a CHAT board 
is reproduced in Figure S1). CHAT involved different 
benefit-packages in each of our three study sites, developed 
in benefit-package selection workshops that are described 
in detail in the Findings section. The premiums for each of 
the benefit options were calculated by using the baseline 
data. The group discussions were led by 6–8 facilitators 
in each location (some chosen from the SHG members 
and some from the field partner organization). These 
facilitators received training from the MIA. The CHAT 
games were conducted in three rounds: during the first 
round (CHAT 1) female participants from the SHGs were 
asked to select the benefit-package that met their and their 
families’ needs (using colored stickers to denote their first 
and second priority). At the end of this individual round, 
each participant could take home a personal copy of the 
CHAT board to discuss the choices with family members. 
The next day, during the second round (CHAT 2), 
a facilitated group discussion was convened, in which 
each female SHG discussed the consequences of the 
choices, and the entire group was requested to select the 
one option that reflected the group’s first choice, and an 
alternative second choice. The facilitators kept a record 
(on a predesigned “CHAT Data Capturing Form”) of both 
individual and consensus choices made in CHAT 1 and 2. 
The third round (CHAT 3) took place about 15 days later, 
and its purpose was to select a single package that would 
be offered by the CBHI to all its potential members; the 
decision-rule was that each female SHG selected one 
package (similar to what was done in CHAT 2), and the 
package that was chosen by most groups was retained in 
each location. All the community members that facilitated 
the CHAT rounds did not get any pay or incentive for par-
ticipating; and the facilitators from the field partner NGOs 
conducted the sessions as part of their normal work duty. 
Table 2 provides the number of groups and individuals 
who participated in CHAT exercises in each site.
individual in-depth interviews
With the view to understanding the motivations underlying 
CHAT choices, we followed a mixed-methods methodology 
using both qualitative, open-ended in-depth interviews, 
and quantitative, closed-ended evaluation questionnaires. 
By doing that, we not only got a better picture on the 
reasons for the choices made, but also an understanding 
of the underlying processes. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with six female SHG members (in their house-
holds) in each of the three sites  (Pratapgarh in November 
2010, Vaishali in December 2010, and Kanpur-Dehat in 
Table 2 number of groups and individuals that participated in 
the cHaT exercises
Pratapgarh Kanpur-Dehat Vaishali
cHaT 1
 individual 383 272 436
cHaT 2
 group 47 29 49
cHaT 3
 group 47 29 49
Abbreviation: cHaT, choosing Healthplans all Together.
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March 2011). At each site, we chose three SHGs which 
had been selected to be offered insurance and to participate 
in CHAT, and interviewed two members from each group. 
We decided to use individual interviews instead of group 
interviews to enable the women to openly voice negative 
impressions related to the group’s decision-making process. 
Additionally, we conducted interviews with two CHAT 
facilitators per site to understand the facilitators’ perspectives 
on the CHAT process and decision-making in the groups. In 
total, we conducted 24 interviews ([6 + 2] ×3). All interviews 
were conducted in the local language (Hindi), tape-recorded, 
and later transcribed and translated into English. The inter-
viewers were trained in using two different sets of semi-
structured questionnaires (one for SHG members and one 
for CHAT facilitators) that contained both exploratory and 
targeted questions inquiring, among other things, about 
experiences with and perception of CHAT, problems encoun-
tered during CHAT, decision-making processes in group 
and household, and reasons for particular choices. Answers 
to these questions were then compared using NVivo® (QSR 
International, Melbourne, Australia) software, version 8. We 
followed the method for directed qualitative content analysis 
described by Hsieh and Shannon,34 combining deductive and 
inductive coding of data.
evaluation questionnaires
We additionally conducted structured, closed-ended evalu-
ation interviews with about 20% of the households that 
participated in CHAT. The main purpose of these interviews 
was to evaluate the awareness campaign wherein CHAT was 
one component.35
Identification of benefit-package options
The first step in the process of benefit-package design 
entailed preparing a limited set of options which would be 
presented to the groups for selection through the CHAT 
exercise. This was done through an interactive exercise 
(called “Benefit-package selection workshop”) facilitated 
by MIA, in which representatives of the field partners and 
of the communities (the SHG federation, SHG members, 
and community leaders, eg, teachers, panchayat members, 
and community health workers) reviewed all the pertinent 
information about morbidity, costs of care, health-seeking 
behavior, and availability of health-care facilities (obtained 
through the baseline study). The discussions revolved around 
several benefit-package options and the premium (the pre-
mium [per person per year] is calculated using the basic 
formula: Pure risk premium = [average expenditures per 
episode] *[incidence rate] assuming a Poisson distribution 
of incidence and truncating frequency distributions of expen-
ditures to take account of including thresholds and caps in 
the insurance coverage) that each package would command 
(community rated per person per year). The output of each 
workshop was four to six packages that would be presented 
to the entire target population for selection.
Method of measuring consensus: 
coefficient of unalikeability
We define consensus as “general agreement/resolution 
arrived at by most of those concerned, after everyone’s 
opinions are heard and understood, and a solution is created 
that everyone agrees to”. This definition is in line with the 
approach used by Sultana and Thompson36 and Mohammed 
and Ringseis.37 We apply “unalikeability”, meaning “how 
often observations differ from one another” to measure the 
consensus reached within each location.38 Unalikeability is 
expressed as a coefficient that measures variability of the 
categorical variable “the package that people chose”. Each 
package was numbered (see package numbers in Table 3). The 
choices of every participant were noted in each session and 
compared with those of other individuals in the same location; 
individuals were matched to others through a random process 
of pairing. For each pair, we noted whether the choices were 
identical (denoted 0) or not (1). By using the techniques of 
combinatorics we counted all the observations that differed 
(by Excel® 2010 [Microsoft Corporation,  Redmond, WA, 
USA]). The value of the coefficient lies between 0 and 1, 
where 0 indicates that all observations within the set are 
identical and 1 means that all observations differ from each 
other. If the coefficient of unalikeability decreased over con-
secutive sessions, we concluded that the differences within 
the cohort were decreasing, and the zero value of the coef-
ficient of unalikeability meant that complete convergence was 
reached on a particular package. We preferred this method 
over Kappa statistics, which is used for measuring reliability 
of judgment (especially useful when agreement is sought on 
something rare). Kappa statistics usually involves agreement 
or disagreement of observers on one event, which is different 
from the CHAT exercises, where many persons need to select 
one item from a set of multiple items. Table S2 shows the 
computation of the coefficients with first and second choices 
in the three locations.
Kader and Perry38 did not discuss any statistical properties of 
the coefficient of unalikeability, but since the coefficient is calcu-
lated from the frequency distribution of choices, we calculated 
the significance of differences of the coefficients by estimating 
 
R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 H
ea
lth
ca
re
 P
ol
icy
 d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 h
ttp
s:
//w
ww
.d
ov
ep
re
ss
.c
om
/ b
y 
14
5.
5.
17
6.
8 
on
 2
9-
Au
g-
20
19
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
                               1 / 1
Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 2014:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
143
consensus-building within communities in rural india on health microinsurance
Table 3 Options retained at the benefit-package selection workshops, and the package selected during CHAT (in INR unless a 
different unit is stated)
Benefit type/
package
Pratapgarh Kanpur-Dehat Vaishali
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6a 1 2 3 4 5 6
lab test (PPPY) – – – – – – – – – – 200 200 100 200 200 100
imaging (PPPY) – – – – – – – – – – 300 300 200 300 300 200
Wage loss (per day) 100 100  100 75 100 75 100 75 100 0 100 100 0 100 100
From day (numbers  
represent days)
3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
To day (numbers  
represent days)
8 8 8 13 13 13 13 13 13 9 9 9 9
consultation with 
medicine
– – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospitalization
PPPY 5,000 5,000 6,800 6,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 4,500 2,000 2,000
Per family per year 25,000
Hospitalization for 
c-section
3,000 3,000 3,000 5,000
Deduct (payable  
by govt)
1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400
Transportation – 200  100 100 100 150 150 200 100       
Life                 
natural death 30,000 30,000 30,000
accidental death 75,000 75,000 75,000
Disability due to 
accident
             37,500 37,500 37,500
Premium per person per year (in INR)
PPPY – family up to 5 157 162 176 176 192 221 243 270 290 192 187 197 236 1,287 197 236
PPPY – family 6–8 157 162 176 176 192 221 243 270 290 192 178 188 225 1,278 188 225
PPPY – family 9+ 157 162 176 176 192 221 243 270 290 192 160 169 203 160 169 203
Life premiums                 
PPPY 1 person 100 100 100
PPPY 2 persons 50 50 50
PPPY 3 persons 67 67 67
PPPY 4 persons 50 50 50
PPPY 5 persons 40 40 40
PPPY 6 persons 33 33 33
PPPY 7 persons 29 29 29
PPPY 8 persons 25 25 25
PPPY 9 persons 22 22 22
PPPY 10 persons              20 20 19
Package chosen    ***      ***  ***     
Notes: aPackage number 6 in Kanpur-Dehat district was not designed in the original workshop; instead, it was created after feedback from the community, which wanted a 
higher cap for individual hospitalizations. Based on the package originally chosen by the groups in cHaT – package 1 – a new package entailing basically the same benefits and 
the same price but a family floater instead of an individual cap was designed and then agreed to by the community. ***Indicates the package that was chosen in the respective 
locations from among the options considered.
Abbreviations: cHaT, choosing Healthplans all Together; govt, government; PPPY, per person per year; inR, indian Rupee.
the significance of difference between the distributions under 
different settings, by employing the chi-square test.
Findings
The benefit-package options considered
The options that were retained in the benefit-package 
selection workshops were presented to the target population 
in the different CHAT rounds and drawn as “CHAT boards” 
(Figure S1). The data are shown in Table 3.
We used the coefficient of unalikeability to measure the 
variability of choices made. We observed that the coefficient 
of unalikeability decreased over consecutive CHAT rounds 
in all locations, indicating that groups gradually adopted a 
consensus on one package. Incidentally, groups in all three 
locations converged towards consensus also on their second 
priority package (data not shown). The differences in the 
values of the coefficients of unalikeability were significant 
(P,0.000).
The data in Figure 1 clearly shows that consensus was 
higher in CHAT 2 than in CHAT 1, and increased further 
in CHAT 3. CHAT 3, like CHAT 2, was a group choice, 
which took place 15 days after CHAT 2, and following 
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discussions that each individual had with others in her 
household and community. One might have expected that 
external influences from people that did not participate in 
the deliberations in the SHGs would reduce consensus; how-
ever, the coefficient of unalikeability decreased, implying 
that consensus had actually increased after interactions with 
outsiders. This finding clearly indicates that the consensual 
choice was not limited only to persons that participated in 
the CHAT exercises, but reflects the views of the entire 
target population in each location on the desirable benefit-
package for them.
After the CHAT rounds, we conducted structured 
closed-ended evaluation interviews with about 20% of 
the participants, who were asked about the main reason 
for their choice in CHAT 2 and in CHAT 3. The results 
are shown in Table 4. Interestingly, at the CHAT 2, about 
one-quarter of the respondents in all locations said that 
they wanted to be part of a group choice and therefore 
chose the package that “other SHG members liked”. The 
three other reasons (cheapest, best, or most benefits) had 
different weights across the locations. But in CHAT 3, the 
consensus was dominant in all locations. When all three 
cohorts were aggregated, increase in the preference for 
consensus choice was significant (P=0.037, chi-squared test).
We conducted in-depth interviews with female SHG 
members that participated in CHAT and with a few facili-
tators and cite here their testimonials, as addition to the 
quantitative information.
In general, respondents expressed their satisfaction with 
the benefit-package selection process:
I like that type of game. Everything in that game was to be 
praised. [SHG member 5, Kanpur-Dehat]
We liked the method, we liked pasting the stickers. 
[SHG member 2, Vaishali]
[The CHAT exercise] was very good and we all liked 
it very much. [SHG member 2, Pratapgarh]
According to one facilitator, CHAT encouraged the 
participation of all SHG members and their families in the 
decision-making process:
Usually in our group meetings […], people listen to these 
things silently and nod their heads, but in this CHAT game, 
there was participation from all women. […] The family 
members also joined, so this is indeed a good method. 
[Facilitator 1, Vaishali]
Table 4 Why people chose the package they did
Pratapgarh Kanpur-
Dehat
Vaishali
no of respondents 115 72 104
CHAT 2
Participated in cHaT 2a 80.9 72.2 72.1
Reasons for choosing the final package (among participants)b
 Other sHg members liked it 25.8 25.0 24.0
 cheapest 20.4 32.7 26.7
 Best 21.5 21.2 25.3
 Most benefits 22.6 3.8 14.7
 Other 9.7 17.3 9.3
CHAT 3
Participated in cHaT 3a 73.9 62.5 62.5
Reasons for choosing the final package (among participants)b
 Other sHg members liked it 35.3 33.3 33.9
 cheapest 24.7 28.9 27.7
 Best 12.9 24.4 21.5
 Most benefits 25.9 8.9 12.3
 Other 1.2 4.4 4.6
Notes: aPercentage of the respondents; bpercentages of those that participated in 
cHaT 2 or 3, respectively.
Abbreviations: cHaT, choosing Healthplans all Together; sHg, self-help group.
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Figure 1 Coefficient of unalikeability in three CHAT rounds and three locations.
Abbreviation: cHaT, choosing Healthplans all Together.
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People enjoyed the participatory nature of the CHAT 
exercises, liked the deliberations, and liked to make their 
own decisions:
The best thing in the CHAT was that the women were free to 
choose any package that they liked. It was not imposed on 
them, and there were no restrictions or obligations to choose 
a particular package. [Facilitator 2, Pratapgarh]
The data from our in-depth interviews also confirm that 
group decisions reflected a consensus rather than major-
ity decision. Respondents described the discussions that 
occurred and how their opinions were considered:
[The choice] was a consensus and our opinions were 
 entertained. [SHG member 2, Vaishali]
We all discussed and everyone agreed to it. [SHG 
member 3, Vaishali]
It was a collective decision. [SHG member 5, Vaishali]
They [the other SHG members] were discussing […] 
which package should be chosen and which one is better for 
us. Every person decided that there would be one insurance 
for all. [SHG member 2, Kanpur-Dehat]
There was discussion in which some said that pack-
age number 4 is best. Then we all favored it as well. […] 
After the discussion […] we all agreed. [SHG member 1, 
Pratapgarh]
Corresponding to the evaluation interviews, which 
showed that respondents chose packages other SHG mem-
bers liked, we found qualitative evidence in all locations 
that people often looked up to trusted peers in their groups 
and considered their choices. For instance, in Pratapgarh, 
one member said:
Knowledgeable people know their benefits; what is right or 
what is wrong. Everyone selected the same package. [SHG 
member 4, Pratapgarh]
And in Vaishali, one facilitator explained:
Everybody believes in the secretary of the group. Whatever 
the decision the secretary will take, that will be important. 
Anyhow everybody gives her opinion but the chairman’s 
opinion is most important. [Facilitator 2, Vaishali]
However, respondents did not simply copy the decisions 
or opinions of administrative officers. Everyone’s opinion 
was entertained and considered as important, as explained 
in the following testimonial:
Everyone’s suggestion has equal importance in the groups. 
This is all about the groups, that everyone has to go together 
and [has to take] care of each other’s interest. [Facilitator 2, 
Kanpur-Dehat]
It is recalled that as part of the decision-making process, 
participants in the CHAT 1 took home a copy of the CHAT 
boards in order to validate choices and obtain support from 
family and friends. Several interviewees mentioned the value 
of these consultations:
After CHAT 1, we gave everybody the CHAT board to 
discuss all the possibilities with family members. […] They 
showed the board to the male members of the family. After 
that, heads of different families discussed how to deal with 
it. As the women cannot do all the work, they rely on the 
head of the family or those who they consider the head of 
the locality like the teacher or the doctor. […] When they 
approve the same, then the women can pursue the matter. 
[Facilitator 2, Kanpur-Dehat]
Nevertheless, this interaction was not always easy 
and sometimes necessitated additional explanations from 
other SHG members or NGO staff to convince family 
members:
[During CHAT in the group] everything was good, […] but 
when they shared with their respective homes, they were 
criticized by some family members. […] It was resolved 
when the person who criticized was convinced by others, 
so they understood everything about it. [SHG member 1, 
Kanpur-Dehat]
Clearly, even though the women were empowered to 
make choices in the CHAT exercises, it was essential to 
also secure the agreement of the men in order to enable the 
women to actually confirm the choice and later actually 
enroll and pay:
[…] [T]he decision is taken by the male guardian or the 
husband in the family, since it is a matter of money. Unless 
[they] were not told by the family guardian [women] cannot 
pay the instalments. They said that the way in which they 
are conducting the meetings with the women of the group, 
in the same way there should be meeting with other family 
members, guardians and head of the family, to convince 
them. [Facilitator 2, Pratapgarh]
In summary, our evidence shows that in all locations, 
the target population was keen to converge towards 
consensus. Local leaders, knowledgeable persons, and 
male household heads influenced the discussion and the 
decision-making process, and wanted to be involved in 
more detail.
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The benefit-packages chosen
The pre-selectors in the three locations seemed to have 
different perceptions of the main issues that the population 
was facing. In Vaishali, the pre-selectors suggested three 
patterns: one that included hospitalization and outpatient 
care, another which focused mainly on outpatient care, 
and the third which included these health packages plus 
life insurance. The community rejected the life insur-
ance option, and of the two health options, it favored the 
outpatient model but included wage-loss compensation 
in case of hospitalization, and chose the option com-
manding higher premiums. This community could take 
advantage of government-provided hospitalization insur-
ance for people below the poverty line (RSBY, Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana), which probably explains why they 
did not retain hospitalization benefits.
In Pratapgarh, the pre-selectors retained benefit-packages 
covering hospital-related care: hospitalizations, wage-loss 
during hospitalizations, and transportation to hospital, as well 
as coverage of delivery with C-section. In this region, RSBY 
was almost nonexistent when the CBHI was implemented. 
This group enhanced the likelihood of claims by many 
members when it added a benefit related to maternity which 
is not otherwise available free of charge.
In Kanpur-Dehat, the pre-selectors proposed a combined 
set of benefits covering both hospitalizations and outpatient 
consultations; the target population reached consensus on 
the premium level, but wanted a different set of benefits that 
would enhance intra-household cross-subsidization.
The intention to choose a package  
that will benefit many members
We observed that both the pre-selectors and the community 
employed different strategies to enhance the likelihood that 
many households would benefit from CBHI.
In Vaishali, the pre-selectors proposed a decreasing pre-
mium per person as household size increases. This arrange-
ment was a de-facto cross-subsidy from smaller households 
to larger ones, and the groups in Vaishali confirmed their 
agreement to this intra-group subsidy. Indeed, 14% of the 
enrolled families, which actually comprised 24% of the total 
enrolled individuals, benefited from this discount in Vaishali. 
Of the families with family sizes between six and eight 
(average 6.35), 13% got a discount of 5%, and 1% of the 
families with family size nine and above (average 9.33) paid 
15% less than the base premium. As for package composition, 
this community chose mainly outpatient care benefits that 
are more likely to be claimed by many members.
In Kanpur-Dehat, the group accepted the benefit types 
proposed by the pre-selectors, but requested a change in the 
terms applying to hospital benefits, so that the cap would 
apply to a household rather than to each individual separately. 
This was labelled “family floater”, which means that within a 
cap per family and per event (rather than a cap per person per 
year), one household member can claim more than one event 
per year. This arrangement institutionalizes intra-household 
cross subsidization and adds welfare to the most vulnerable 
members, as well as to the non-claiming household members 
(that are released from the obligation to pay for repeat hos-
pitalization of close relatives). In addition, the combination 
of inpatient and outpatient benefits increased the likelihood 
of claiming a benefit by many insured members.
As already mentioned, some respondents chose a 
particular package because it was “cheapest” or had “most 
benefits” (Table 4). We bring a few testimonials to shed more 
light on the considerations that influenced the choices made, 
especially in Kanpur-Dehat and Pratapgarh:
I was going for [the more expensive package] but which 
may be difficult for other members. Hence I joined the col-
lective decision to accommodate others, as all the others 
have to benefit. [SHG member 4, Kanpur-Dehat]
This indicates that when discussing the price, the par-
ticipants were concerned not merely about their ability to 
pay, but of other members as well. The two facilitators in 
Kanpur-Dehat observed the same behavior pattern:
Everyone selected packages for themselves keeping in mind 
their own benefits […] But when they met among them-
selves and were informed that a single package is applicable 
for the whole group they realized that […] they all should 
select a package that is affordable for all. [Facilitator 2, 
Kanpur-Dehat]
Additionally, SHG members in Kanpur-Dehat chose to 
go for the cheapest option to “test” CBHI, which was a new 
concept for the community, as explained by a facilitator:
Wherever we visited, everyone used to say that they want 
to opt for the minimum one for the first year. If we benefit 
then we may look for the better one next year. [Facilitator 2, 
Kanpur-Dehat]
In Pratapgarh, our in-depth interviews revealed that CHAT 
participants often set benefits in relation to price and opted for 
package 4 after realizing that it cost only slightly more but 
offered more benefits than other packages. It was especially 
important for them that packages 4 and 2 (their first and second 
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choice) were “broader” than the other packages (ie, offered a 
higher variety of benefits). This shows that they did not simply 
assume that the most expensive package would provide the 
most benefits. Otherwise, they would have chosen package 3 
over 2. Instead, they preferred a package with most benefit types 
with lower caps over few benefit types with higher caps.
In Kanpur-Dehat, the selection emphasized insuring 
minor illnesses and outpatient care. A facilitator in Kanpur-
Dehat described how households which had experienced 
hospitalization in the past first favored expensive packages 
with more hospital coverage. However, the community chose 
cheaper packages, reflecting that most would not need to be 
hospitalized but would need coverage of outpatient care for 
minor but frequent illnesses:
The people selected the packages keeping in mind their 
own experience. […] Though there were some people who 
wanted to get more benefits with the large packages, most 
people wanted to start with the small package, keeping in 
mind that very few people do visit the hospitals and most 
of the people prefer to visit the local doctors. [Facilitator 1, 
Kanpur-Dehat]
In Pratapgarh, where outpatient care was not included 
in any of the packages offered, some interviewees criticized 
the choice of the pre-selectors to include only inpatient 
coverage:
There are several issues here […] they have not included 
minor ailments and the benefits in case of Caesarian sec-
tion only. If one is delivering normally, then nothing will 
be paid. [SHG member 2, Pratapgarh]
Generally, respondents in all three sites expressed their 
satisfaction with the final package chosen:
We are fully satisfied with [our choice]. [SHG member 2, 
Pratapgarh]
Everybody is satisfied [with the package we have 
 chosen]. [SHG member 1, Vaishali]
We are very satisfied with [the package we have chosen]. 
[SHG member 5, Kanpur]
Discussion
This article deals with benefit-package design for CBHI in 
rural and informal settings in India. The CBHI model dis-
cussed here is characterized by voluntary and contributory 
affiliation, in which the entire group is encouraged to join 
en bloc. These new conditions of introducing health insur-
ance include a more meaningful and engaging experience of 
customers directly with the design of the benefit-package, 
based on exchanges with others, rather than deciding in 
isolation, and emphasis on a group solution which addresses 
perceived priorities of the target group that the community is 
best placed to validate collectively rather than any individual 
alone. This process is much more sophisticated than expect-
ing a decision merely on the merit of an unverifiable claim 
that premiums are low, and the relationship with the insurance 
to end, not begin, once people pay the premium.
The implementation model relies on collective action to 
select the benefit-package, which determines the share of 
health-care costs borne by the CBHI. We explored previous 
studies of how collective action was mobilized effectively. 
Ostrom39 pointed to extensive fieldwork that established that 
individuals voluntarily organize to provide, inter alia, mutual 
protection against risk. She added that typically when people 
engage in direct communications with each other, they can 
generate cooperative behavior or create a social norm that 
has a certain staying power in encouraging the growth of 
cooperative behavior over time. Cooperative behavior thrives 
on a process that leads to implementation of changes (which 
in our study entailed a decision on a benefit-package that 
would be implemented by the CBHI schemes). Consensus 
magnifies the buy-in of decisions, but there is some debate on 
whether consensus means unanimity of opinions or involving 
everybody in the same process (with possibly a large majority 
of identical opinions). We have shown that consensus can be 
expressed quantitatively rather than just categorically (as a 
binomial Yes/No), and that the degree of consensus improved 
through an iterative process of decision-making. The salient 
lesson from this study is that the wish to be part of the con-
sensus was the most important motive for choice of benefit-
package (Table 4), more than the price or the composition 
of the package. Another important insight is that there is no 
contradiction in saying that each community can agree on 
the application of one and only one package to everybody in 
that community, while also saying that communities living 
in different conditions choose different packages. The three 
communities reached consensus, which was to select a pack-
age that reflected different morbidity patterns, socioeconomic 
statuses or available health-care services. The similarity was 
the process of consensus building, and the difference was the 
actual package. This finding corroborates previous claims 
that one size cannot fit all locations but a similar decision 
process can.40 The similarity was in a descending value of the 
coefficient of unalikeability over subsequent iterations of the 
facilitated choice exercise (Figure 1) and in the motivation 
mentioned by many to join a consensus (Table 4).
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The finding that individuals chose packages that can 
enhance benefits to their community is interesting from a 
perspective of theory of demand. Conventional insurance 
demand theory posits that demand decisions are made by indi-
viduals on the basis of their perceived marginal utility from 
the purchase of insurance.41,42 In the CBHI model described, 
the balance between self and community interests was 
achieved by starting the process with a phase of individual 
choice of package, followed by face-to-face exchanges with 
other community members in small groups. The consensus of 
small groups (composed of women that participate in SHGs) 
was then shared with their family members, and the facili-
tation given to women to discuss their choices with family 
and community members created an opportunity to discuss 
why other participants preferred different choices, recognize 
the legitimacy of other opinions, and seek a way to devise a 
compromise consensus. The discussions were then repeated 
with members of other groups in the same community who 
also elaborated their consensus in a similar process, and the 
follow-up discussions led to higher consensus. Our evidence 
corroborates the results of Mohammed and Ringseis37 that 
consensus building is gradual and requires multiple itera-
tions with frequent face-to-face informal exchanges between 
community members. Our participatory process generated 
high satisfaction with the process and with the resultant 
benefit-package, as attested by the testimonials. More impor-
tantly, participation in the CHAT process was instrumental 
in enhancing understanding of the insurance process in 
the context of CBHI, which was positively associated with 
higher enrolment.35 As such, the process can serve to scale 
penetration of insurance in rural settings in India, by creating 
more awareness, leading to more trust, which in turn leads 
to higher enrolment.
An important common denominator of the choice pro-
cess in all three locations was its inclusive nature and the 
intention to enhance the likelihood that many members of 
the community should benefit from the CBHI. Additionally, 
community leaders who participated in the benefit-package 
selection workshop enhanced the probability that house-
holds will be able to cope with multiple episodes within the 
household (Vaishali) and ensured that poorer households 
would be able to participate in CBHI by offering discounts 
for large households (Vaishali) or by choosing cheaper 
packages affordable to everyone, with the “family floater” 
cap (Kanpur-Dehat). Some of these novel provisions have 
been either initiated or confirmed by consensus of the large 
grassroots groups, so that there can be no doubt that they 
were able to understand the welfare-enhancing potential of 
these arrangements. We therefore conclude that the demand 
for CBHI in the informal sector in rural India is based in large 
part on collective priorities, and on the general understanding 
that if most people did not like the package on offer, there 
would be no CBHI at all for anybody.
The CHAT process specif ically involved women 
organized in SHGs. In CHAT 1, they made their choices 
independently from other family members. Although it 
was reported that men would finally decide whether to join 
CBHI, our data also show that when male household heads 
provided feedback on choices women made in CHAT 1, most 
men generally agreed. On the other hand, when women had 
difficulty explaining their CHAT choices to their family or 
getting agreement, they were supported by the NGO staff to 
convince family members. Clearly, each woman commanded 
a different degree of authority and empowerment within 
their household. Baily43 reported that women needed male 
guardian consent to participate in SHG activities, and the 
expectation of male villagers that such participation would 
benefit both the women themselves and their families and 
communities.
Within SHGs, there are issues of power relations. Although 
our groups are usually quite homogeneous, some differences 
may exist in education and socioeconomic status. Each group 
elected a president, secretary, and treasurer. It was reported 
in our interviews that the opinion of these women was often 
followed because they were trusted. At the same time, CHAT 
facilitators and participants stressed that the opinion of all 
women was considered when reaching consensus. A similar 
process was observed by Seshagiri et al44 when small groups 
were asked to solve specific tasks (in a village in the Indian 
Karnataka state): the more educated members and those that 
were more articulate had more influence solving the tasks, 
who nonetheless tried to actively engage “weaker” members 
in the activity. We conclude that although more educated 
SHG members had an influence on the group’s decisions in 
our study, they did not hijack the decision-making process, 
as decisions were taken with consent of all group members. 
On the whole, interactive and continuous engagement in 
three rounds of CHAT exercise and exposure to insurance 
education have provided the SHG women an opportunity to 
be socially empowered.
limitations of the study
The small number of in-depth interviews conducted does not 
allow the claim that they were generally representative; we 
therefore also triangulated this source with the findings from 
the CHAT exercises and exit questionnaires. The interviews 
were conducted by researchers employed by the partner 
NGOs; this might have affected respondents’ comments on 
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the CHAT process facilitated by these NGOs. On the other 
hand, respondents might have been more responsive during 
the interviews because they were familiar with the local 
researchers and the NGO.
Most of the SHGs in which we conducted CHAT have 
been operating for years and are used to collaborate and 
make decisions in group settings. This could have facilitated 
the CHAT process.
Conclusion and policy ramifications
This study offers clear empirical evidence that people liv-
ing in rural informal settings, some of whom are illiterate 
and innumerate and with no prior experience with health 
insurance, can reach consensus on the choice of their 
health insurance benefit-package. The subject matter is 
quite complex, but when presented in a game-like way, 
without compromising the actuarial accuracy, people can 
select packages within their willingness to pay and their 
perceived priorities for health-care coverage. The evidence 
suggests that group consensus can be harnessed to enhance 
demand for health microinsurance in the informal economy. 
Moreover, the people chose the benefit-packages with a 
clear intention that as many members of their community as 
possible should benefit. This suggests that people are sensi-
tive to enhancing equity within the group and that CHAT 
enables them to make inclusive choices. The packages that 
were chosen by the three groups were in fact implemented 
in the three locations in the form of CBHIs that captured 
solvent demand, and created the supply of health insurance, 
neither of which existed previously.
The question might be raised whether it is necessary to 
conduct CHAT exercises and consensus building in each 
village separately. The evidence from our field experiments 
points that when a population group is introduced to the 
concept of CBHI for the first time, following this process 
is important as it creates the basic sense of empowerment 
and relevance that cannot be achieved in another way. 
However, in a region where CBHI has been introduced and 
is perceived as successful, neighboring villages may well 
wish to join the same scheme without elaborate preparations. 
Such villages would be involved in the entire process, along 
with others, when major changes in the benefit-package are 
contemplated.
It is noted that harnessing the collective action in a man-
ner described in this article did not occur spontaneously. It 
required catalytic facilitation by devoted and knowledgeable 
persons who guide the process at village level from incep-
tion, who first collected relevant information in the field, 
translated it to actuarial estimates of premiums for different 
benefits, and then guided the community discussions. This 
process can be replicated anywhere in the informal sector, 
provided that the similar catalytic actor/change-maker can 
lead communities to assume the role of market-makers of 
their own health insurance.
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Table S1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile of the CHAT participants
Pratapgarh Kanpur-Dehat Vaishali All combined
average age, years (seM) 41 (0.59) 39 (0.65) 36 (0.50) 39 (0.33)
Married, % 88.0 86.4 94.1 90.0
Hindu, % 86.6 92.9 97.9 92.8
scheduled caste and scheduled tribe, % 41.5 26.0 41.8 37.5
average years of education (seM) 2.2 (0.19) 3.5 (0.22) 2.3 (0.16) 2.6 (0.11)
self-employed, % 15.5 19.0 13.9 15.8
Wage employment, % 19.0 6.0 14.1 13.5
average monthly per capita  
expenditure, inR (seM)
1,147 (30.45) 1,776 (71.02) 1,377 (43.47) 1,408 (28.53)
n 432 352 525 1,309
Abbreviations: cHaT, choosing Healthplans all Together; inR, indian Rupee; seM, standard error of the mean.
Figure S1 cHaT board used in Kanpur-Dehat.
Abbreviation: cHaT, choosing Healthplans all Together.
Supplementary materials
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